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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
WEARABLE PRIVACY PROTECTION WITH VISUAL BUBBLE
Wearable cameras are increasingly used in many different applications such as
entertainment, security, law enforcement and healthcare. In this thesis, we focus on
the application of the police worn body camera and behavioral recording using a
wearable camera for one-on-one therapy with a child in a classroom or clinic. To
protect the privacy of other individuals in the same environment, we introduce a new
visual privacy protection technique called visual bubble. Visual bubble is a virtual
zone centered around the camera for observation whereas the rest of the environment
and people are obfuscated. In contrast to most existing visual privacy protection
systems that rely on visual classifiers, visual bubble is based on depth estimation to
determine the extent of privacy protection. To demonstrate this concept, we construct
a wearable stereo camera for depth estimation on the Raspberry Pi platform. We
also propose a novel framework to quantify the uncertainty in depth measurements
so as to minimize a statistical privacy risk in constructing the depth-based privacy
bubble. To evaluate our system, we have collected three datasets. The effectiveness
of the proposed scheme is demonstrated with experimental results.
KEYWORDS: privacy protection, visual bubble, privacy bubble, wearable camera,
depth uncertainty, stereo quantization
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The increasing computation power of small embedded platforms and affordable
camera sensors have enabled many new and diverse applications ranging from enter-
tainment, security and law enforcement to healthcare.
Some of these applications have significant privacy concerns. For example, in the
past year, there have been strong calls for U.S. law enforcement officials to wear body
cameras and record their interactions with the general public [1–3]. The police worn
body cameras are intended to enhance police transparency and accountability, and
they can also protect police officers from false complaints. Such videos, if shared,
could offer a wealth of information to social scientists, journalists, and others. By
now, body cameras have been adopted by the majority of the law enforcement officials
in the UK and the US [4,5]. According to a nationwide survey conducted by the Major
Cities Chiefs Association and Major County Sheriffs’ Association, almost every large
police department plans to move forward with body-worn cameras [5]. Among these
police departments, 95 percent have either committed to body cameras or completed
their implementation. However, privacy concerns have been raised because of the lack
of guideline of the use for the cameras or the footage. The most important concern
is in the avoidance of recording sensitive locations and situations. While it is entirely
acceptable to record physical encounters between the police and individuals during
law-enforcement related activities, sensitive background environments like bathrooms,
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clinics, and schools should not be recorded [6]. Such concerns have already begun to
impede the popularity of body worn cameras. For example, a bill was introduced in
Minnesota to prohibit the use of police body camearas for one year [7].
Another example is video recording the behaviors of special-need children, es-
pecially their interactions with others in naturalistic environments like schools and
homes. They are highly valuable for diagnosis and treatment of various developmen-
tal disorders including autism and ADHD [8]. With the popularity of smartphone
cameras and wearable cameras, videos can be recorded in almost any environment,
capturing important intermittent behaviors that are difficult to observe during a brief
clinical visit. By sharing such videos, they have become an effective tool to facilitate
communication between families and professionals [9, 10]. However, their usages are
governed by a myriad of privacy laws including HIPAA [11] and FERPA [12] in the
US. Consent from bystanders is often difficult, if even possible, to obtain. Many
studies have found that privacy is among the top concerns when setting up cameras
in home and at school and sharing such videos online [13–16].
As a result, visual privacy protection has garnered a great deal of attention in
the last few years. A recent survey paper has provided a comprehensive overview
of different visual privacy protection technologies [17]. Most existing visual privacy
protection schemes rely on intelligent classifiers to identify sensitive information such
as faces or entire persons for protection. However, many of these classifiers are of
questionable reliability. Furthermore, these techniques require additional selection
mechanisms to differentiate target subjects, whose behaviors need to be recorded,
from others whose privacy needs to be protected [18]. Any misidentification of target
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subjects can defeat the entire purpose of privacy protection.
The main problem considered in this thesis is how to design robust privacy pro-
tection schemes for wearable cameras to protect unintended bystanders and private
environments. We propose a wearable privacy-enhanced camera that can be mounted
on an adult observer for video recording. The preliminary design is shown in Figure
1.1. The novel contribution of our proposed system is its use of a “visual bubble”
for privacy protection; the “visual bubble” defines an adjustable virtual zone around
the camera for recording. A key advantage of visual bubble is that it does not rely
on any human detector which can be unreliable. Instead, it uses pixel-based depth
measurement which can be estimated with high enough fidelity for privacy protection.
The popular Kinect 2 camera by Microsoft provides a very low-cost solution for such
an application. Using a Kinect camera, we can easily demonstrate a visual bubble
by selectively applying obfuscation on the color pixel based on its depth value. An
example is shown in Figure 1.2.
On the other hand, the Kinect camera is not portable and does not work well
in outdoor environments. Among all depth sensing technologies including time-of-
flight, structured-light and stereo, the stereo camera provides the most versatile form
of recording - it can cover a long distance and be used under a wide range of il-
lumination from bright outdoor sunlight to dim indoor light. Also, its reliance on
simple color cameras implies the highest resolution, the smallest size, and the lowest
cost. The downside is that stereo cameras are not as accurate as other depth sens-
ing technologies [19]. Thus, it is imperative to address the accuracy issues of stereo
vision systems in order to use it for privacy protection. In this thesis, we propose
3
Figure 1.1: Wearable privacy camera
Figure 1.2: Privacy bubble implemented with Kinect 2 camera
an embedded design of privacy-enhanced wearable stereo cameras using embedded
cameras on the popular Raspberry Pi platform [20]. In our design, the depth mea-
surement is based on disparity estimated by a stereo matching algorithm and we have
systematically compared different state-of-the-art stereo matching algorithms for our
target application. Furthermore, we propose a statistical framework to quantify the
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uncertainty of the depth measurement and create the visual bubble by minimizing a
statistical privacy risk so as to satisfy the more conservative requirement of privacy
protection.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review related work
about visual privacy protection. Additionally, traditional and some state-of-the-art
stereo matching algorithms will be reviewed. We propose a distance based privacy
protection technique in Chapter 3. We also develop the framework of analyzing the
uncertainty in stereo-depth measurement and describe the privacy bubble system
based on the probability framework. We present our hardware implementation and
experimental results in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and discusses future
work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
With the pervasiveness of surveillance and smartphone cameras, visual privacy
has attracted much attention in recent years [17]. In this chapter, visual privacy
protection techniques will be briefly reviewed. Since the visual privacy protection we
are going to propose is based on distance estimated from stereo matching, traditional
and some state-of-the-art stereo matching algorithms will also be reviewed.
2.1 Review of visual privacy protection techniques
Visual privacy protection means protecting the confidentiality of the private in-
formation in images and videos from being revealed to the general public. Private
information or region of interest to protect varies based on different situations. It
can be a person’s face, facial expression, gait, credit card number, computer screen
or printed document and so on. Visual privacy protection involves filtering out or
scrambling the sensitive information; as with general privacy protection problems,
visual privacy protection needs to strike a balance between privacy protection and
utility. For example, if all of an image, not only the sensitive part, is scrambled, the
image is of no utility any more; however, if no privacy related processing is done,
private information will be revealed.
For visual privacy protection, there are techniques to prevent the private infor-
mation from being captured in the first place. For example, the BlindSpots system
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designed by Patel et. al. is able to locate the retro-reflective CCD or CMOS camera
lenses around a protected area and emits a pulsing light toward the detected lens,
spoiling the images that may be captured [21].
After the image or the video is captured, visual privacy protection mainly consists
of identifying the private information (or region of interest) and secure processing to
hide the private information. The method of detecting sensitive regions can be (1)
object-recognition based: e.g., facial recognition algorithms can be used to identify
individuals; (2) visual-marker based: e.g. [22] makes use of colored markers, such as
hats or vests, to identify the individuals who wish to remain anonymous; (3) gesture-
based: e.g., the invidual who wishes to be protected (or to be revealed) needs to
perform a specific gesture; (4) others: e.g., RFID [23] and biometric signals [18] can
be used to identify sensitive information.
Measures taken to hide private information include (1) blanking: totally removing
the region of interest; (2) filtering: e.g., applying Gaussian blurring or pixelation to
the region of interest; (3) encryption: regions of interest of an encrypted image cannot
be viewed by persons who do not have the decryption key; (4) abstraction: sensitive
image regions are replaced by bounding boxes; individuals to be protected are re-
placed by avatars, silhouettes or edges from an edge detector; (5) others: e.g., video
inpainting is used to fill the privacy region with the background; face-deindentification
can be done to change the face in a way such that the identity is consealed, but gender
and facial expression are preserved. There is a vast literature about visual privacy
protection; interested readers are referred to [17,24,25].
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2.2 Review of stereo matching
Stereo matching is one of the earliest approaches for depth measurements [26]. In
computer vison, the problem of stereo matching is well studied [26] and it continues to
be an active research area because of the challenges in finding stereo correspondence,
e.g., lack of texture, repetitive patterns, reflective surface and so on. There are quite
a few of review papers on stereo vision disparity algorithms as well [26–32].
Stereo matching algorithms can be categorized into sparse stereo matching and
dense stereo matching. Sparse stereo matching usually extracts feature patterns first
and then matches the feature correspondences. It generates only a sparse disparity
map with the advantages of more reliable match and less running time. However, with
the development of computing hardware and the need of new applications, most of the
modern stereo matching algorithms fall into the second category which is generating
a dense disparity map. Dense stereo matching algorithms generally perform (subsets
of) the following four steps [26]: (1) matching cost computation; (2) cost (support)
aggregation; (3) disparity computation/optimization; (4) disparity refinement. Most
of the algorithms take two or more already rectified stereo images as input, since
rectification as a preprocessing step restricts the search range for correspondence to
epipolar lines which greatly saves the computation effort.
In the step of computing matching cost, lots of different metrics have been used.
Among them, the most common ones are absolute intensity difference, the squared
intensity difference and the normalized cross correlation. According to different fea-
tures in the second and following steps, stereo matching algorithms are classified into
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the local approach and the global approach.
In a local approach, also called window based approach, matching costs in a
support window are aggregated to reduce the impact of noises and get a more reliable
result. The support window can be a fixed size square or rectangle centered at the
pixel of interest. However, the support window of fixed size fails near disparity
discontinuity because the underlying assumption that pixels in the support window
have constant disparity is violated. Adaptive support window is able to overcome this
problem. In the third step of a local approach, usally a winner-take-all strategy is
used to determine the disparity of a pixel. Finally, refinements, such as interpolation,
subpixel enhancement, median filtering, and bilateral filtering, are done to improve
the disparity map.
On the other hand, a global approach treats the disparity assignment problem
in an energy optimization framework. The energy function to be minimized usually
consists of a data term and a smoothness term. Popular optimization methods are
dynamic programming, Markov random field, graph cut, belief propagation and so
on.
Real time stereo matching can be achieved with the help of Graphics Process-
ing Unit (GPU) and/or additional hardware such as field-programmable gate arrays
(FPGA) and application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC). Real time stereo match-
ing algorithms are mostly based on the local approach. On one hand, regular and
simple operations such as basic filtering can be easily and efficiently implemented with
computing hardware; on the other hand, parallelism can be better taken advantage of
in a window based approach on a GPU. Although these algorithms can achieve real
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time speed, their performance usually suffers from limited computation time. Global
approaches are usually not implementable in real time because of its iterative nature.
Besides, the complicated optimization algorithm of a global approach also prevents
it from being efficiently implemented with parallel structure.
Readers can find a list of recently proposed stereo matching algorithms and their
performances from Middlebury website (http://vision.middlebury.edu/stereo/
eval3/) and KITTI stereo vision website (http://www.cvlibs.net/datasets/
kitti/eval_stereo_flow.php?benchmark=stereo). This thesis will look
more carefully at [33] and [34] because the these two algorithms are among the top
runners of the Middlebury and KITTI stereo vision score board, and their implemen-
tations are publicly available.
In [33], the authors developed a slanted plane model to jointly recover an image
segmentation, a dense depth map, as well as boundary labels. Their slanted plane
model algorithm is between 2 to 3 orders of magnitude faster than earlier slanted
models [35,36]. Besides, their model is shown to be insensitive of choice of parameters.
In [34], Zbontar et al. proposed to compute the matching cost by training a con-
volutional neural network to learn a similarity measure on small image patches. The
authors point out that the learning transfers well in the sense that the neural network
can be trained using one dataset and predict the results on a different dataset. As
an example, the validation error on KITTI 2012 is even lower when using Middle-
bury traning set than when using KITTI 2015 training set, although the KITTI 2015
dataset is closer to the KITTI 2012 dataset.
10
Chapter 3
Visual Bubble System
Up to now, most work on visual privacy protection is done for single cameras. The
drawback of the aforementioned approaches of detecting sensitive regions in Chapter
2 is their reliance on image segmentation and subject and/or gesture identification
algorithms that may not be reliable enough for privacy protection. However, for some
applications concerning privacy, for example, police worn body cameras and behav-
iorial/educational observation of children with special need, subject identification is
not crucial.
This thesis proposes a distance based visual bubble for privacy protection. This
approach relies on stereo cameras as the capturing device. To the author’s best knowl-
edge, this is a novel approach for visual privacy protection in spite of its simplicity.
Visual bubble can be a depth bubble which is purely distance based, or a privacy
bubble which also considers the uncertainty of the distance/depth measurement. In
this chapter, we will first describe the depth bubble. We use stereo matching to
measure distance, or depth. In a privacy-concerned application, the reliability of
the depth measurement should be considered. Therefore, we develop a probability
framework for quantifying the uncertainty of depth measurement and describe the
privacy bubble system based on the framework. Finally, we describe the superpixel
technique that is used as a denoising post-processing in generating the visual bubble.
The functional block diagram of the visual bubble system is shown in Fig. 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Visual bubble system
3.1 Depth bubble and depth from stereo
Depth bubble is a distance based visual privacy protection technique. It only
shows pixels within a prescribed depth range from the camera, and whatever falls
outside of the range will be filtered out. The effect of the depth bubble is like the
spotlight on a dark stage. The advantages of this approach are that pixel-based depth
measurement from stereo image pairs can be estimated with high enough fidelity for
privacy protection and the cost is low enough for the general public. This approach
relies on the assumption that the subject of interest is usually the person closest to
the observer and therefore, falls within the bubble.
The creation of depth bubble depends on estimating the depth Z for each pixel,
which is inversely proportional to its disparity value d, given the camera focal length
f and the stereo baseline B, that is,
Z =
fB
d
. (3.1)
Therefore, determining the disparity from stereo matching is a key step.
12
Figure 3.2: Quantization effect
3.2 Uncertainty in stereo depth measurement
Although stereo matching algorithms keep improving, a pixel’s disparity, or its
depth z estimation, inevitably involves errors and measurement uncertainty. For a
stereo matching algorithm which yields integer disparity values, the uncertainty of
the depth estimate mainly comes from two sources: (1) the uncertainty in the stereo
matching process due to matching ambiguity; (2) the uncertainty of disparity value
itself due to the digital nature of the imaging system. The quantization effect is
illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Assume the two red blocks on the image planes correspond
to the image pixel, any spacial point in the red region forms the same images on the
two image planes and has the same disparity. In other words, a pixel’s disparity error
is partly because of stereo correspondence mismatch due to the defect of the stereo
matching algorithm; even if the disparity value from the stereo matching algorithm
is correct, the disparity value also suffers from quantization. Therefore, this chapter
is mainly dedicated to proposing a framework to quantify the uncertainty in depth
measurement and developing an uncertainty-aware privacy bubble.
Based on the uncertainty sources of the depth measurement, our goal in this
section is to characterize the conditional probability density function (pdf) f(z|d)
13
(the probability density function of depth z given measured disparity d) in order
to determine how reliable the depth estimate is. We model f(z|d) based on its
relationship with two other pdf’s: f(z|dk) and P (dk|d) where dk with k = 0, 1, 2, ...
represents the ideal but unknown disparity, quantized due to the discrete nature of the
system. Using Bayes’ rule, these three pdf’s are related by the following relationship:
f(z|d) =
∑
k
f(z|dk)P (dk|d). (3.2)
3.2.1 Uncertainty due to quantization
Quantization error in stereo imaging system is analyzed in [37, 38]. This thesis
follows [37].
For standard stereo pinhole camera setup where the two camera image planes
are coplanar as shown in Fig. 3.3, assume f is the focal length of both cameras,
B is the baseline, δ is the image sampling interval. Assume a spatial point with
world coordinate (X, Y, Z) forms images on both image planes at PL and PR, whose
x-coordiates are xL and xR, respectively.
Due to the discrete nature of the imaging system, xL and xR suffer quantization
error up to ±1/2δ. With slight abuse of notation, let the random variable x¯L and
x¯R denote the unquantized x-coordiates of PL and PR. Define the random variable d¯
and z as follows,
d¯ := x¯L − x¯R,
z :=
fB
d¯
. (3.3)
14
Figure 3.3: Stereo imaging model
Now assume x¯L and x¯R are independent and uniformly distributed. Given the
quantized image coordinates xL and xR, their conditional pdf’s are provided as fol-
lows:
f(x¯L|xL) = 1/δ, for xL − δ
2
≤ x¯L ≤ xL + δ
2
,
f(x¯R|xR) = 1/δ, for xR − δ
2
≤ x¯R ≤ xR + δ
2
.
Note that d is only available to us as a quantized value. As such, for consecutive
quantized disparity values dk := kδ, where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,m, d¯ are confined in the
interval [dk−1, dk+1], with a triangular-shaped pdf,
f(d¯|dk) =

1
δ2
(d¯− dk) + 1δ , for dk−1 ≤ d¯ ≤ dk,
− 1
δ2
(d¯− dk) + 1δ , for dk < d¯ ≤ dk+1.
(3.4)
Let
zk :=
fB
dk
, (3.5)
where k = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
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It follows from (3.3), the conditional pdf of z given dk is
fZ(z|dk) = fD¯(d¯|dk)
fB/d¯2
∣∣∣
d¯= fB
z
.
Substituting in (3.4), we obtain
fZ(z|dk) =
(
1
δ2
(fB
z
− dk) + 1δ )fBz2 , for zk ≤ z ≤ zk−1,
(− 1
δ2
(fB
z
− dk) + 1δ )fBz2 , for zk+1 ≤ z < zk.
(3.6)
Since the real depth z is confined within the range [zk+1, zk−1], we could use the
length ∆k of this interval to quantify the uncertainty of true depth:
∆k := zk−1 − zk+1 = 2fB
z2kδ
− δ
fB
. (3.7)
Note that the farther the point is from the camera, the bigger ∆k is and the more
uncertain its true depth becomes. Also, a smaller baseline B means bigger depth
uncertainty. This is important to the design of a wearable stereo camera as the
baseline is highly constrained due to its compact size.
Now we have obtained the uncertainty of the depth measurement given the quan-
tized true disparity. The disparity value is “true” in the sense that we have assumed
perfect stereo matching in producing the disparity value d.
3.2.2 Uncertainty from stereo correspondence ambiguity
In a practical stereo matching system, false matches often occur due to varying
illumination, lack of texture of the scene, reflected surface and camera distortion,
etc. The uncertainty of the stereo matching process is modeled by P (dk|d), which is
the conditional probability of the quantized disparity dk corresponding to the perfect
disparity, given the measured disparity value d obtained from the stereo matching
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algorithm. One way to model P (dk|d) is to assume dk takes values centered at d with
variance σ2 proportional to the stereo matching cost.
The approach to estimate matching cost largely depends on the specific stereo
matching algorithm itself. Some stereo matching algorithms will give stereo matching
cost map as well as the disparity map. Simplistic error functions [39] and signal-to-
noise ratio [40] were proposed to model the matching cost. More recent works estimate
the matching cost using different machine learning techniques, ranging from linear
discriminant analysis [41] to random forest [42] and convolutional neural network [34].
In the next chapter, we show one approach to estimate P (dk|d) for the popular
semi-global matching algorithm [43]. As the approach is specific to the implementa-
tion of the algorithm, we defer the description to the next chapter.
3.3 Uncertainty aware privacy bubble
In this section, we show how the privacy bubble is generated using the estimated
f(z|d). In our target application, the subject that needs to be recorded is close to the
wearable camera while we want to protect the privacy of the rest of the environment.
Therefore, we could rely on the depth map and its uncertainty to segment the fore-
ground subject and generate a privacy bubble by obfuscating other pixels. Assume
we would like to generate a privacy bubble around the foreground subject within the
depth of zp. In order to generate the privacy bubble, we need to decide whether a
pixel with depth z should be shown or obfuscated. While the true z is unknown, we
have a measurement of disparity d. The conditional probability of the event z < zp
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given d can be numerically computed as follows:
P (z < zp|d) =
∫ zp
zmin
f(z|d)dz. (3.8)
To determine whether this pixel should be revealed, we rely on the following likelihood
test:
P (z < zp|d)
1− P (z < zp|d) > S, (3.9)
where S > 0 is the privacy protection threshold. If (3.9) is satisfied, the pixel is
shown. Otherwise, it is obfuscated. The choice of threshold S reflects how stringent
the privacy requirement of the target application is. S  1 will be very conservative
but may wrongly obfuscate part of the subject of interest.
Now, we can apply the results from Section 3.2 to evaluate (3.8). It can be
simplified with (3.2) and (3.6) as follows:
P (z < zp|d)
=
∫ zp
zmin
∑
k
f(z|dk)P (dk|d)dz
=
m∑
k=l+1
P (dk|d) + P (dl−1|d)
∫ zp
zl
f(z|dl−1)dz
+ P (dl|d)
∫ zp
zl+1
f(z|dl)dz, (3.10)
where zl ≤ zp < zl−1 and m is the upper bound of the disparity searching range.
3.4 Post processing with superpixel
The idea of superpixel was originally developed in [44]. By grouping pixels into
perceptually meaningful clusters, superpixel technique has been widely used in depth
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Figure 3.4: Superpixel example
estimation, segmentation, body model estimation and object localization [45]. One
example of superpixel is shown in Fig. 3.4.
In our system, we use the ERS algorithm [46] to segment the input frame into R
superpixels, where R is set large enough to ensure no semantic objects are lumped into
a single segment. The superpixel segmentation is formulated as a graph partitioning
problem. For a graph G = (V,E) and R superpixels, the goal is to find a subset
of edges A ⊂ E to approximate a graph G¯ = (V,A) with R connected sub-graphs.
The vertex corresponds to a pixel in an image and an edge is formed by 4-connected
neighborhood with weights computed based on color-similarity between connected
vertices. The clustering objective function comprises of two terms: the entropy rate
H of the random walk on A and a balancing term B:
max
A⊂E
H(A) + λB(A) with NA ≥ R (3.11)
where NA is the number of connected components in G¯. The entropy term encourages
compact and homogeneous clusters, whereas the balancing term encourages clusters
with similar size. Finally, to overcome exact optimization difficulty, a greedy algo-
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rithm with an approximation bound of 1
2
is used to solve the problem.
Once the superpixels are computed, we use them to guide a simple denoising
procedure of the input matrix X, where X is the disparity map d in depth bubble
and the probability map P (z < zp|d) in privacy bubble. In the denoising step, we
first compute the average of the inputs over each superpixel and then replace the
individual input value at each pixel with the average of the superpixel to which
the pixel belongs. This is based on the assumption that color-consistent neighboring
pixels are more likely to have similar disparity or probability values. This assumption
holds for small neighborhoods and greatly improves the accuracy of disparity along
color edges. It is, however, important to set the number of superpixels R large enough
so that a large spatial object, which could have a large range of disparity values, will
not be accidentally clustered into a single superpixel.
In summary, this chapter proposed a distance based privacy protection technique
called visual bubble. Visual bubble can be either depth bubble or uncertainty aware
privacy bubble. Depth bubble can be generated by thresholding the depth map with
specified bubble range and depth is measured based on stereo matching. Further-
more, this chapter developed a framework to quantifying the uncertainty of depth
measurement from stereo matching. Built on this framework, an uncertainty-aware
privacy bubble was developed and finally the superpixel technique was proposed to
be used in visual bubble post-processing.
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Chapter 4
Hardware Implementation and Experiment
In this chapter, firstly, we describe the hardware implementation for the wear-
able visual bubble system. Secondly, we present the three datasets (image sequences)
we have collected for evaluation purposes. The first two datasets are captured by
our system. The third dataset is collected from Microsoft Kinect 2 RGB-D camera
sensors and therefore, there is depth information enabling quantitative evaluation.
Thirdly, we propose using semi-global (block) matching with superpixel (SGBM +
SUP) to generate the depth bubble, which is evaluated and compared with the classic
semi-global (block) matching (SGBM) [43] and other state-of-the-art stereo match-
ing algorithms. Additionally, we compare the depth bubble with uncertainty-aware
privacy bubble to illustrate the effectiveness of the uncertainty framework and our
proposed privacy bubble scheme. Some of the earlier results can be seen in [47].
4.1 Hardware implementation
We have built the wearable visual bubble system using Raspberry Pi Compute
Module (RPCM). The block diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 4.1. The wearable
system consists of the RPCM, an I/O board, two Pi cameras and a WiFi dongle
providing networking capability, as seen in Fig. 4.2. The RPCM is a small outline
dual in-line memory module (SODIMM) sized (6.5cm by 3cm) Raspberry Pi board
that contains the BCM2835 chip with 512MB RAM along with an onboard 4GB
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Figure 4.1: System Diagram
eMMC Flash memory. Integrated into the BCM2835 chip are a 700 MHz single-
core ARM1176JZF-S CPU and a 250MHz Broadcom VideoCore IV GPU. The Pi
camera has an image sensor with native resolution of 5 megapixel and is capable of
capturing 2592 × 1944 static images and 1080p30, 720p60 and 480p60/90 videos. In
our implementation, we will use the the resolution of 640 × 480. The onboard power
supply provides 5V DC power boosted from a 3.7V 2500mAh Li-Po battery. The
wireless interface features an Edimax 150 Mbps 802.11n WiFi USB adapter.
Figure 4.2: System components
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Figure 4.3: Hardware implementation
The prototype, housed in a 3D printed case and mounted on a chest strap harness,
is shown in Fig. 4.3. While the current prototype is quite large (11.7cm by 9.7cm
by 6cm), using a customized PC Board instead of the RPCM I/O board from the
Raspberry Pi development kit would make the system much smaller. The stereo
vision system can be controlled by a smart phone via an SSH connection.
The CAD model of the camera mount is shown in Fig. 4.4. The STL model of
the case is shown in Fig. 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Pi camera mount CAD model
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Figure 4.5: System case STL model
4.2 Dataset collection
We have collected 2 datasets using the system described in Section 4.1. No ground
truth depth images are captured. The image pairs are then rectified using extrinsic
parameters of the stereo camera acquired from camera calibration. Dataset 1 contains
76 pairs of stereo images (5-second video with 15 fps) in the outdoor environment.
Sample images are shown in Fig. 4.6. Note that only the left images are shown.
Figure 4.6: Dataset 1 sample (left) images
Dataset 2 contains 120 pairs of stereo images (8-second video with 15 fps) in the
indoor environment. Sample images are shown in Fig. 4.7.
In order to evaluate our proposed algorithms quantitatively, datasets with avail-
able ground truth depth are required. Currently, there are some publicly available
stereo datasets with ground truth disparity. The most notable ones are Middle-
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Figure 4.7: Dataset 2 sample (left) images
bury Stereo dataset (http://vision.middlebury.edu/stereo/data/) and
KITTI stereo vision benchmark dataset (http://www.cvlibs.net/datasets/
kitti/eval_stereo.php).
For a privacy protection scheme designed to be used in a privacy-concerned sit-
uation, it is better to be aware of the weakness and reliability of the protection
technique. For our case, we should take into consideration the uncertainty com-
ing from the stereo matching algorithms. This is especially true for wearable stereo
cameras, because the small baseline of wearable stereo cameras will enlarge the un-
certainty caused by disparity quantization. Since the aforementioned public datasets
were captured by stereo cameras with much larger baselines (for example, the stereo
camera baselines for Middlebury 2014 stereo dataset are around 150-240 mm while
our baseline is only 60 mm), using these datasets will not be able to most effectively
demonstrate the importance of the uncertainty analysis; therefore, we will generate
our own dataset (with ground truth depth) to test the proposed privacy protection
technique for our specific wearable camera system. Besides, it is always good to test
a system in a real situation where it shall be put into use.
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4.2.1 Dataset collection using Kinect 2
First, set up a pair of kinect 2 cameras as in Fig. 4.8 after calibrating each of them
to align the color sensor and depth sensor. The color sensor image planes are set to
be roughly coplaner. The basedline is set to about 60 mm, mimicking the baseline of
the Pi-stereo system. We have captured 100 frames of color and depth images from
both kinects simutaneously.
Figure 4.8: Stereo kinect setup
For Kinect 2, the resolutions for the captured color image and depth image cannot
be modified. The resolutions are 1920 × 1080 for color images and 512 × 424 for
depth images by default. Since the color images and the depth images have different
resolution, we need to call the MapColorFrameToDepthSpace() function in or-
der to generate a depth image whose resolution matches that of the color image. Then
color images and depth images are rotated and resized to mimic the images capu-
tured by Raspberry Pi cameras with 640 × 480 resolution. Finally, Bouguet’s stereo
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rectification algorithm with opencv implementation is used to rectify the stereo color
image pairs and depth images pairs. Sample color images (left image of the stereo
pair) are shown in Fig. 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Dataset 3 sample (left) images
4.2.2 Ground truth depth calculation
Stereo rectification as the preprocessing step for stereo matching can greatly re-
duce the work for searching for stereo correspondence because corresponding pixels
are warped to the same scan line of the images, i.e., they lie on the same row on the
image pairs. The effect of rectification is illustrated in Fig. 4.10. Rectified image
pairs can be treated as captured by a standard vitual stereo rig, as if in Fig. 3.3 in
Chapter 3. Since for the virtual rig, the camera orientations are different from the
original kinect depth sensor orientation, we need to calculate the ground truth depth
for the rectified color images.
Assume pinhole camera model. Let the world frame coincide with the camera
frame of the camera 1, it follows that for camera 1,
s

u
v
w
 = M1 [I | O]

X
Y
Z
1
 , (4.1)
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Figure 4.10: Stereo rectification
where s is the scaling factor, [u v w]T is the homogenous pixel coordinates, and
M1 :=

fx 0 cx
0 fy cy
0 0 1
 (4.2)
is the camera matrix for color camera 1.
For any spatial point P on the original left image corresponding to pixel coor-
dinates (i, j), which is the pixel at the j-th row and i-th column, we would like to
calculate its coordinates in the world frame. It follows that
s

i
j
1
 =

fx 0 cx
0 fy cy
0 0 1


X
Y
Z
 . (4.3)
Thus, 
X
Y
Z
 = s

fx 0 cx
0 fy cy
0 0 1

−1 
i
j
1
 = s

i−cx
fx
j−cy
fy
1
 . (4.4)
Therefore, s = Z, X = Z
fx
(i− cx) and Y = Zfy (j − cy).
From the stereo rectification implementation of opencv reading as
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stereoRectify(cameraMatrix[0], distCoeffs[0],
cameraMatrix[1], distCoeffs[1],
imageSize, R, T, R1, R2, P1, P2, Q,
CALIB_ZERO_DISPARITY, 0, imageSize,
&validRoi[0], &validRoi[1]);
R1 is the rectification transform (rotation matrix) for the first camera, denoted as
R1 :=

r11 r12 r13
r21 r22 r23
r31 r32 r33
 .
Assume in the rectified camera 1 frame, the coordinates of P are P ′l =
[
X ′ Y ′ Z ′
]T
,
it follows that 
X ′
Y ′
Z ′
 = R1

Z
fx
(i− cx)
Z
fy
(j − cy)
Z
 . (4.5)
Thus,
Z ′ = Z(
r31
fx
(i− cx) + r32
fy
(j − cy) + r33). (4.6)
Let f ′ be the camera focal length and B be the baseline of the virtual rig. The
ground truth disparity of point P in the virtual rig is
d =
f ′B
Z ′
=
f ′B
Z( r31
fx
(i− cx) + r32fy (j − cy) + r33)
. (4.7)
Note that f ′ is directly available in the P 1 matrix (P 1 is the projection matrix for
the left image used in rectification, which is P1 in the above code snippet), f ′ = P 111.
Baseline B can be calculated from P 1 matrix as
B =
‖P 114‖
P 111
, (4.8)
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where ‖ · ‖ denotes the absolute value of (·), P 1ij denotes the entry of matrix P 1 on
the i-th row and j-th colomn.
Sample depth images corresponding to the images in Fig. 4.9 are shown in Fig.
4.11. The valid depth is assumed in the range of [500, 4500] (unit: mm) and the
maximum value is set to be 5000 mm. The depth images are saved in CV 8U data
format.
Figure 4.11: Dataset 3 sample depth images
4.2.3 Validation of the ground truth depth
Method in the last subsection provides the ground truth depth, and therefore,
ground truth disparity for the left image of the color image pairs. Since we can do
the same thing and get the ground truth depth for the right image, the ground truth
depth image pairs can be compared to check the quality of the depth image.
Shown in Fig. 4.12 are a pair of grey image pairs (converted from color images)
and the corresponding depth images. A 11 x 11 pixel template is chosen in the left
image, marked by a red box in the image. Then template matching (using grey images
as input; therefore, grey images are shown in the figure) is done, the correspondence
template is found in the right image and verifed by inspection. Now depth values
from the two views at the same position marked with the red box are compared to
evaluted the accuracy of the depth measurement. Depth values from 5 image pairs
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and 5 templates on each image pair (totally 25 templates) are used, that is, 25 ×
121 depth value pairs. The average difference of the depth pairs is calculated to be
13.8324 mm, and the standard deviation of the depth difference of the depth pairs is
9.5411 mm. Since the depth resolution for depth data encoded in the CV 8U format
is 19.6 mm (0-5000 mm depth encoded as 255-0), the depth images acquired from
last subsection are accurate enough to be treated as ground truth depth.
Left image Right image
Left depth image Right depth image
Figure 4.12: Depth validation by comparing depth of matching templates
4.3 Experimental results
In our wearable visual bubble system, the stereo baseline B = 6 cm, the focal
length of the Pi camera f = 3.60 mm, and image sampling interval δ = 6 µm. With
the wearable system, we have created two datasets, one for outdoor environment and
31
one for indoor environment.
For depth bubble application, we propose, first, use semi-global block matching
to generate disparity map; second, use superpixel technique as post-processing; and
finally threshold the disparity map to generate the depth bubble. In order to evaluate
our proposed algorithm, we compare it with 3 different stereo matching algorithms
(the common last step is thresholding the disparity map to generate depth bubble) :
(1) semi-global stereo matching (SGBM, without post-processing with superpixel); (2)
slanted plane model based segmentation algorithm (SPSEG) [33]; (3) convolutional
neural network (CNN) based learning algorithm [34].
For uncertainty aware privacy bubble, we propose, first, calculate the disparity
map using semi-global stereo matching; second, estimate the matching reliability and
generate the probability map; third, use superpixel to clean the probability map; and
finally, threshold the probability map to generate privacy bubble. We compare results
from this algorithm with our depth bubble algorithm, and show that it is beneficial
to consider uncertainty in the stereo-matching.
In order to compare the generated bubble image (both depth bubble and privacy
bubble) quantitatively, we compare the bubble mask image (recall that the mask
image is a binary matrix, with 1 denoting that the corresponding pixel should be
exposed, and 0 denoting that the corresponding pixel should be filtered out) with the
ground truth bubble mask image. The metrics we have used are precision (P ), recall
(R), F1 score and smoothness (S). Let TP = True positive, FP = False positive,
FN = False negative. (Note that, TP is also called hit; FP is also called false
alarm, which is the Type I error; FN is also called miss, which is the Type II error.)
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Precision, recall and F1 score are defined as:
P =
TP
TP + FP
, R =
TP
TP + FN
, F1 =
2P ·R
P +R
.
F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall and it is commonly used in
statistical analysis of binary classification as a measure of a test’s accuracy.
We have calculated the precision, recall and F1 score for each frame and computed
the arithmetic mean of precision, recall and F1 score of 41 frames in dataset 3 in which
frames a subject is in the visual bubble. Besides, we have also counted the number
of 8-connected components with size larger than 10 pixels as a quantitative results
for mask smoothness (S).
4.3.1 Depth bubble results
The depth bubble experimental results for two frames from dataset 1 are shown
in Fig. 4.13. The specified bubble depth range is 3.2 m.
The depth bubble experimental results for dataset 2 are shown in Fig. 4.14.
The specified bubble depth range is 3 m. In this set of results, the bubble images
using SPSEG and SGBM+SUP are good. The depth bubble using CNN algorithm
exposes lots of pixels which should not be shown, although it gives very smooth
bubble boundary.
For dataset 3, since ground truth disparity is available, we can compare the dis-
parity map generated from all the algorithms with the ground truth disparity. This
comparison is not based on a specific bubble depth; therefore, it indicates the overall
performance of these stereo matching algorithms.
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Original image 1 SGBM SPSEG
CNN SGBM+SUP
Original image 2 SGBM SPSEG
CNN SGBM+SUP
Figure 4.13: Depth bubble results: dataset 1
For each algorithm, we have computed the disparity for every frame in dataset 3.
Disparity error is calculated as the difference between the computed disparity with
the ground truth disparity. We then take the disparity errors for all frames and get
the histogram of the disparity errors, as shown in Fig. 4.15. We also compute the
mean and standard deviation of the disparity errors, as shown in Table. 4.1. From
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Original image 1 SGBM SPSEG
CNN SGBM+SEG
Original image 2 SGBM SPSEG
CNN SGBM+SUP
Figure 4.14: Depth bubble: dataset 2
comparison, SPSEG and SBGM+SUP perform better.
The depth bubble experimental results for dataset 3 are shown in Fig. 4.16. The
specified bubble depth range is 2.5 m. Quantitative results using precision, recall, F1
score and smoothness as metrics are provided in Table 4.2.
As we can see from the qualitative and quantitative results, the SGBM algorithm
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SGBM SPSEG
CNN SGBM+SUP
Figure 4.15: Histogram of disparity errors for dataset 3
Table 4.1: Mean and standard deviation of the disparity errors for dataset 3
Algorithm mean (unit: pixel) standard deviation (unit: pixel)
SGBM [43] -2.5517 5.8845
SPSEG [33] 0.9699 3.5119
CNN [34] 1.9131 8.2517
SGBM+SUP -2.2258 3.8110
performs well, but the biggest problem is that the generated bubble image contains
lots of 8-connected components (‘small holes’) rendering the bubble not clean nor
smooth. This motivates our proposed depth bubble algorithm, which is based on
SGBM but uses superpixel to clean up the bubble image. The slanted plane model
based segmentation algorithm preserves connectedness of image segments very well
and generates clean bubble images. The CNN based learning algorithm, although
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Original image 1 SGBM SPSEG
Ground Truth Bubble CNN SGBM+SUP
Original image 2 SGBM SPSEG
Ground Truth Bubble CNN SGBM+SUP
Figure 4.16: Depth bubble: dataset 3
shows the highest recall rate, but also has the lowest precision. This can be easily
seen from the qualitative results where lots of pixels are falsely exposed, which may
cause a serious problem as far as privacy is concerned. Although CNN based learning
algorithm is among the top runners of stereo matching algorithms on the score board
of Middlebury stereo website, and it claims to have good performance in the transfer
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Table 4.2: Precision, recall, F1 score and smoothness of depth bubble masks
Algorithm P R F1 S
SGBM [43] 0.8556 0.9539 0.8992 26.0488
SPSEG [33] 0.8225 0.9750 0.8896 3.5854
CNN [34] 0.7295 0.9786 0.8343 12.4390
SGBM+SUP 0.9100 0.9034 0.9019 3.5366
learning settings where the validation error is computed on a different data set than
the one used for training, it has been shown in our experiment that its precision is the
lowest among the four algorithms we are comparing. The reason is that the neural
network we have used was trained using the Middlebury dataset which is greatly
different from the dataset we use for testing. Overall, our proposed SGBM with
superpixel algorithm has the highest F1 score and the smallest average number of
connected components.
4.3.2 Privacy bubble results
As seen in Chapter 3, our privacy bubble generation scheme depends on the
disparity uncertainty, or reliability estimate for a stereo matching algorithm. The
estimation approach will mostly depend on the specific stereo matching algorithm.
In this subsection, we first illustrate how we estimate the uncertainty of the disparity
map and demonstrate a privacy bubble with zp = 3.6m. Here, we choose privacy
protection threshold S = 4. Through experimental results, we then show the benefit
of adding uncertainty analysis in generating the visual bubble.
Using the Matlab implementation of the semi-global block matching algorithm [43],
the parameter ‘UniquenessThreshold’ indicates the uniqueness of a correspon-
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(a) Original image (b) Disparity map (c) reliabilityMap
(d) Probability map (e) Privacy bubble (f) Depth bubble
Figure 4.17: Privacy bubble generation
dence match. If the second smallest sum of absolute difference (SAD) value over
the whole disparity range is not larger than the smallest SAD by the extent spec-
ified by this parameter, the estimated disparity will be marked as unreliable. We
observed that when ‘UniquenessThreshold’ is set to 100, all of the stereo match
will be labeled as unreliable. As such, we have run a series of tests by varying
‘UniquenessThreshold’ from 0 to 90 with a stepsize of 15. By counting how
many times the computed disparity value is label as ‘reliable’, we could quantify the
reliability of the disparity map of each pixel into seven levels, with 7 being the most
reliable and 0 being not reliable at all. Figure 4.17(c) shows the reliability of the
disparity map, with the red end being the most reliable.
Next, for reliability level k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 7, assume the true disparity falls into one of
1 + 2(7− k) disparity bins and the probability mass function forms a triangle shape
with the given computed disparity value in the middle. We use (3.10) to calculate
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the overall probability of a spatial point being within the privacy bubble. Then,
the probability map is post-processed by the superpixel algorithm where superpixels
are formed based on original color image. The result is shown in Figure 4.17(d).
Figure 4.17(e) shows the actual privacy bubble based on our probability calculations
compared with the depth bubble generated by simply thresholding the depth map as
shown in Figure 4.17(f). One can see that in the depth bubble, there is a ‘hole’ above
the main subject because of the falsely computed disparity, as seen in Fig. 4.17(b).
However, the reliability of that disparity value is low; thus, corresponding pixels don’t
have high enough probability to enter the privacy bubble. Therefore, the ‘hole’ has
been filtered out in the privacy bubble.
The privacy bubble experimental results for two frames from dataset 1 are shown
in Fig. 4.18. The specified bubble depth range is 3.6 m and the privacy protection
threshold is S = 4. From comparing the depth bubble and privacy bubble, it can
be seen that privacy bubble with the uncertainty framework integrated can better
protect the unintended bystander.
The privacy bubble experimental results for two frames from dataset 2 are shown
in Fig. 4.19. The specified bubble depth range is 3 m and the privacy protection
threshold is S = 4. It is shown in Fig. 4.19 that a threshold can be chosen to make
the privacy bubble more conservative.
Table 4.3 provides the quantitative comparison between the 2.5 m depth bubble
and 2.5 m privacy bubble using the metrics of precision, recall, F1 score and smooth-
ness. The privacy bubble is only slightly better than the depth bubble, because of
the relative simple scene within the specified range.
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Original image 1 Disparity map Reliability map
Probability map Depth bubble Privacy bubble
Original image 1 Disparity map Reliability map
Probability map Depth bubble Privacy bubble
Figure 4.18: Privacy bubble results: dataset 1
As we can see from the experimental results, the proposed visual bubble (depth
bubble and privacy bubble) works equally well in both indoors and outdoors. Gener-
ally, the privacy bubble based on the probability framework outperforms the depth
bubble in terms of privacy protection. More results can be found at http://vis.
uky.edu/nsf-autism/wearable-privacy-cam/.
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Original image 1 Disparity map Reliability map
Probability map Depth bubble Privacy bubble
Original image 1 Disparity map Reliability map
Probability map Depth bubble Privacy bubble
Figure 4.19: Privacy bubble results: dataset 2
Table 4.3: Precision, recall, F1 score and smoothness of visual bubble masks
Algorithm P R F1 S
SGBM+SUP depth 0.9432 0.9216 0.9267 2.6585
SGBM+uncertainty privacy 0.9303 0.9451 0.9326 2.2195
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we have proposed a new visual privacy protection technique called vi-
sual bubble. A visual bubble can be a depth bubble which is purely distance based,
or a privacy bubble which also considers the uncertainty of the distance/depth mea-
surement. In a privacy-concerned application, the reliability of the depth measure-
ment should be considered. To minimize the statistical privacy risk in constructing
the depth-based visual bubble, stereo depth uncertainty has been considered in two
aspects: uncertainty from quantization and from imperfect stereo matching. We de-
velop a probability framework for quantifying the uncertainty of depth measurement
and describe the privacy bubble system based on the framework.
An implementation of the wearable privacy camera using Raspberry Pi Compute
Module has also been presented. In the software aspect, we propose using semi-
global block matching with superpixel (SGBM + SUP) to generate the depth bubble,
which is evaluated and compared with the classic semi-global block matching (SGBM)
and other state-of-the-art stereo-matching algorithms. Besides, we have compared
the depth bubble with uncertainty-aware privacy bubble. Experimental results have
demonstrated the effectiveness of the uncertainty framework and our proposed privacy
bubble scheme.
In addition to a visual bubble with a fixed radius, we have also experimented a
privacy bubble with varying depth based on the closest individual. Figure 5.1 shows
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the preliminary results of determining the radius by clustering pixel depths using the
K-means algorithm (K = 3) and assuming that the closest individual occupies the
closest cluster. The preliminary results are reasonably good though additional work
is needed to determine a more robust clustering scheme.
Original image sequences Visual bubble with varying depth
Figure 5.1: Varying-depth visual bubble
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